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Abstract
This paper provides empirical evidence on the role played by loan supply shocks
over the business cycle in the Euro Area, the United Kingdom and the United
States from 1980 to 2011 by estimating a time-varying parameters VAR model with
stochastic volatility and identifying these shocks with sign restrictions consistent
with the recent macroeconomic literature. The evidence suggests that loan supply
shocks appear to have a significant effect on economic activity, inflation and credit
market variables in all three economic areas. Moreover, we report evidence that over
the past few years the short-term impact of these shocks on real GDP and inflation
appears to have increased in all three economic areas, while this impact on loan
volumes increased mainly for the Euro Area. The results of the analysis also suggest
that the impact of loan supply shocks seems to be particularly important during
recessions. As regards to the most recent recession, we find that adverse loan supply
shocks contributed to between about 10% and about 20% of the total decline in real
GDP growth between 2007 and 2009 in the three economic areas.
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1 Introduction
Financial intermediaries and credit markets more in general appear to have played a
significant role in the context of the events which led to the severe recession experienced
during 2008 and 2009 by advanced economies such as the Euro Area, the United Kingdom
and the United States. Indeed, the economic crisis was preceded and accompanied
by financial turbulence in various segments of financial markets, such as the US sub-
prime mortgage market and the international interbank short-term liquidity market.
Moreover, Lehman Brothers’ default in September 2008 clearly exacerbated the financial
and economic crisis, also bringing at the centre of the attention questions regarding the
actual state of banks’ balance sheets and their ability to provide loans to households and
non-financial corporations to finance consumption and investment expenditure, among
other effects. In addition, it is widely agreed that specific developments in the banking
industry, such as the process of securitisation and the increasing recourse to short-term
debt, contributed markedly to the lending boom and housing bubble of the mid-2000s
and subsequent credit slowdown and house price fall (Brunnermeier, 2009; Diamond and
Rajan, 2009; Gorton, 2009).
From a policy perspective it is important to assess the relative role of supply and
demand forces in driving credit, output and inflation developments, especially during
periods around crises such as the recent one. Indeed, these factors may call for a very
different response of monetary and fiscal policy. Clearly, an insufficient provision of loans
to the private sector by banks caused by balance sheet constraints affecting financial
intermediaries may require a different policy response compared to the case of declining
loan growth due to declining demand from households and enterprises. Thus, for a
central bank it is essential to know whether loan flows to the private sector decline
mainly because of problems affecting balance sheets of banks or largely because the
demand for credit is diminishing. In the former case measures to support the banking
system may be needed, while in the latter case measures to support the real economy
may have priority. Another key challenge which policy-makers face is to disentangle the
role of credit markets as propagators of shocks originating in other sectors of the economy
(such as technological innovations, unexpected changes in oil prices or investors’ changes
in confidence, to make few examples relating to both aggregate supply and aggregate
demand shocks) and as impulse mechanisms, that is sources of disturbances or shocks.
Indeed, the provision of loans to the private sector by banks depends on the state of
banks’ capital and financing capability, which in turn change both (endogenously) due
to the economy’s changing conditions as well as (exogenously) due to factors directly
affecting banks balance sheets. Clearly, the source of the potential problem is different
in these two cases.
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Against this background, a key challenge for policy-makers is to quantify the con-
tribution of supply shocks to loan growth. The purpose of this paper is to propose a
methodology which allows for such contributions to be estimated in the context of an
empirical model which takes into account potentially important changes in the macroe-
conomy and to provide some empirical evidence for the Euro Area, the United Kingdom
and the United States. To account for possibly significant changes in the macroeconomic
environment is a potentially very important step in deriving reliable estimates of the im-
pact of loan supply shocks, as major changes have been taking place in recent years.
For example, there is evidence that the volatility of shocks may have changed over time
(Cogley and Sargent, 2005, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez, 2010). Moreover,
in addition to the evidence for a Great Moderation starting between the mid-1980s and
the early 1990s, depending on the countries considered, the recent economic and finan-
cial crisis may have induced a further gradual structural change in the economy, for
example affecting persistently economic agents’ risk aversion, and although it may be
too early to conclude to which extent fundamental underlying changes may have taken
place it is important to allow for them. Thus, it is critical to estimate the impact of loan
supply shocks in a framework which allows for possible changes in stochastic volatility
and time-varying parameters. The model we use, a time-varying parameter VAR with
stochastic volatility, seems particularly suited for the purpose of this paper. This is one
of the main advantages of the approach adopted in this study compared to the macroe-
conomic literature which has attempted to estimate the effects of loan supply shocks,
which typically is based on fixed parameters and constant volatility models, as discussed
in detail in the next section. The identification of loan supply shocks we adopt is based
on sign restrictions. The latter have been applied before to identify these shocks (see
for example Busch et al., 2010; De Nicolo´ and Lucchetta, 2011; Eickmeier and Ng, 2011;
Hristov et al., 2012), but the way they have been specified has in most cases limitations
which we try to overcome, as we will argue below. Moreover, our paper is the first to
provide a systematic comparison of the relevance of loan supply shocks across the Euro
Area, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The main results of the empirical analysis are the following. First, loan supply shocks
appear to have on average a significant effect on economic activity and credit markets,
but to some extent also inflation, in all three economic areas. However, some differences
across geographic areas can also be uncovered. For example, the short-term impact on
loan volumes appears to be stronger in the United Kingdom, than in the Euro Area or
the United States. Second, the impact of these shocks may have changed over time, as
for example the short-term impact of these shocks on real GDP and inflation seems to
have increased in all three economic areas over the past few years, while this impact
on loans has increased in recent years mainly in the Euro Area. Third, it appears that
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the contribution of loan supply shocks was particulary important during the most recent
recession. For example, the contribution of these shocks can explain almost 20% of the
decline in annual real GDP growth between 2007 and 2009 in the Euro Area and the
United States and almost 10% of that observed in the United Kingdom. Finally, the
contribution of loan supply shocks to the decline in the annual growth rate of loans
observed from the peaks of 2006/2007 to the troughs of 2009/2010 was between almost
10% (UK and US) and about 25% (Euro Area) of the total decline.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion
of the relevant literature. Section 3 illustrates the empirical approach and describes the
data. Section 4 reports and discusses the results. Section 5 provides conclusions.
2 Literature
Credit markets have received much attention in macroeconomics since at least the debt-
deflation theory of Fischer (1933), which assigned a potentially important role to credit
market developments in propagating business cycle fluctuations.1 While most of the
macroeconomic literature of last century focused mainly on credit markets in their role
in transmitting disturbances originating in other markets (Bernanke, 1993, Brunnermeier
et al., 2012, Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek, 2012a), a number of more recent papers have focused
on assessing the potential role of credit markets as sources of disturbances originating
business cycles, including the implications of various types of credit supply shocks, largely
inspired by the events which led to the recent economic and financial crisis. Some of
these papers have introduced a banking sector and some type of credit supply shock
into an otherwise standard New Keynesian DSGE model. For example, Goodfriend and
McCallum (2007) model several types of interest rates, calibrating the model to replicate
several steady-state interest differentials for the US economy, and assess the impact
of various shocks originating from the banking sector – a shock to bank monitoring
productivity and a shock to effective collateral reflecting financial distress – via impulse
responses, showing that monetary policy needs to be adjusted in their presence. Gerali et
al. (2010) estimate a standard New Keynesian DSGE model with an added imperfectly
competitive banking sector for the euro area using Bayesian methods for the period
1998-2009 and find that financial shocks that can be associated to credit supply (such as
shocks to loan-to-value ratios or shocks to bank capital) and find that the contribution
of these shocks to the 2006-2007 expansionary phase and subsequent recession was large.
Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2010) formulate a medium-scale DSGE model with
a competitive banking sector, several real and nominal frictions, and several shocks
in the framework of an otherwise standard New Keynesian model and estimate it with
1See the Supplementary Material Annex for a more extensive review of the literature.
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Bayesian methods for both the Euro Area and the US with data from 1981Q1 to 2009Q2.
Among the shocks, they include two types of bank funding shocks, a bank funding
technology shock and a shock to the bank’s demand for reserves (against deposits, beyond
a minimum required reserve ratio). Although variance decompositions suggest that on
average these shocks do not play a major role in the macroeconomy, they show with
historical decompositions that such shocks had a significant effect on real GDP growth
in specific periods for both the Euro Area and the US, including adverse effects in 2008
and 2009.
Various empirical studies have attempted to estimate the impact of credit supply
shocks on the macroeconomy. A number of papers attempted to assess the role of
credit supply changes to the 1990-1991 US recession, although, as noted for example
by Bernanke (1993) and Cochrane (1994), most papers focused on the role of credit
markets in propagating shocks other than credit (supply) shocks. Other papers focus on
the most recent economic crisis, attempting to proxy loan supply shocks by changes in,
or the exogenous component of, some survey indicator, such as bank lending standards
(for the US, using the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey, see Lown
and Morgan, 2006; Berrospide and Edge, 2010; and Bassett et al., 2012; for the Euro
Area, using the ECB’s Bank Lending Survey, see Ciccarelli et al., 2010; Hempell and
Kok Sørensen, 2010; and Del Giovane et al. 2011) or supervisors ratings on bank health
(Peek at el., 2003). Unfortunately, such approach has important limitations, including
endogeneity problems2 which are difficult to overcome and the issue of the reliability of
replies to the surveys.
A number of recent studies have attempted to identify credit supply shocks in macroe-
conometric frameworks, mainly in the context of structural VARs, largely to assess the
relevance of these shocks in the recent financial and economic crisis.3 Busch et al. (2010)
aim at assessing the role of bank supply shocks in Germany from 1991Q1 to 2009Q2,
with specific reference to loans to non-financial corporations. Bank loan supply shocks
are identified with sign restrictions in a strucutral VAR model. Overall, they find that
adverse loan supply shocks had a large impact on loan growth especially following the
default of Lehman Brothers. De Nicolo´ and Lucchetta (2011) try to assess the role of
demand and supply shocks to bank loans for the set of G-7 countries over the period
1980Q1 to 2009Q3 on the basis of a factor-augmented VAR (FAVAR) model and sign
2Identifying loan supply shocks using such indicators would require to fully extract the component
associated with loan demand forces and the systematic loan supply responses to changes in the macroe-
conomy. The papers mentioned provide attempts to overcome this problem, but limited proxies for all
relevant demand forces inevitably cast doubt on the extent of the success of this methodology.
3A number of studies provide attempts at identifying credit shocks, without explicitly differentiating
credit supply from credit demand shocks, including Gilchrist et al. (2009), Helbing et al. (2011), Gilchrist
and Zakrajsek (2012b), Meeks (2012).
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restrictions. As regards data for credit markets, they use data on bank loans and bank
prime rates (i.e. lending rates for loans to prime customers). The identification scheme
adopted allows them to identify only bank loan demand shocks, which are found to play
an important role in explaining bank credit growth. Eickmeier and Ng (2011) attempt
to identify credit supply shocks via sign restrictions using a global VAR model and as-
sess how they propagate internationally, more specifically how such shocks in the US,
Euro Area and Japan propagate to a sample of 33 countries over the period 1983Q4 to
2009Q4, and find that such shocks can have large effects internationally. As regards the
credit data used, they identify credit supply shocks using data for domestic private non-
financial sector loans as regards credit volumes and corporate bond yields with maturity
between 5 and 10 years as regards the price of credit. Hristov et al. (2012) estimate
a panel VAR with data for eleven euro area countries and try to identify the effect of
loan supply shocks over the period 2003Q1 to 2010Q2. Using data for loan volumes
and lending rates for non-financial corporations, they identify loan supply shocks via
sign restrictions. They find that loan supply shocks played a significant role in driving
both loan growth and real GDP growth especially during the financial crisis, although
considerable cross-country heterogeneity is found.
Overall, the above-mentioned empirical macroeconometric papers have a similar ap-
proach and intent to the one of the present paper, but key differences between our
approach and these other approaches can be highlighted, apart from the identification
scheme discussed later: different modelling choices (ours is the only paper adopting a
time-varying VAR with stochastic volatility, while all other papers employ models with
fixed parameters and constant volatility); different country sets (ours is the only one
presenting a systematic comparison across euro area, UK and US), different data sam-
ple period (ours has the most comprehensive period coverage), and different loan figures
(ours is the only paper using data for volumes and lending rates for the total non-financial
private sector, while other papers limit the scope to the non-financial corporations sec-
tor, providing about half of total private sector loans, or using data for loan volumes and
lending rates not fully consistent with each other).
In parallel, a number of recent empirical contributions tackled the question of the
role of credit supply using microeconomic data. Most of these studies attempt to dis-
entangle the role of credit supply from credit demand, in response to various exogenous
shocks (such as shocks to the money market as that of the summer of 2007, shocks to
financial markets such as the default of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, monetary
policy shocks, sovereign debt shocks etc.), via specific channels such as the bank lend-
ing channel or the bank capital channel (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010, Albertazzi and
Marchetti, 2010, Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez, 2011, Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro´ and
Saurina, 2012, de Santis and Surico, 2013). Overall, these microeconomic studies find
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some interesting results pointing to the importance of credit supply factors, but they do
not address the effect of bank loan supply shocks, focusing rather on the role of credit
supply in propagating other shocks.
3 The empirical approach
In this section we describe the econometric model used as well as the data for the three
economic areas considered.
3.1 The model
We use a time-varying VAR model with stochastic volatility as in Primiceri (2005) and
Canova and Gambetti (2009). Let yt be a vector containing the following variables: real
GDP, consumer prices, loan volumes, a composite lending rate and a reference short-term
interest rate. Let us assume that yt follows
yt = A0,t +A1,tyt−1 + ...+Ap,tyt−p + εt (1)
εt is a Gaussian white noise vector of innovations with time-varying covariance matrix
Σt, A0,t is a vector of time-varying intercepts and Ai,t are matrices of time-varying
coefficients, i = 1, ..., p. Let At = [A0,t, A1,t..., Ap,t], and θt = vec(A
′
t), vec(·) being the
stacking column operator. The VAR coefficients are assumed to evolve as random walk
θt = θt−1 + ωt (2)
where ωt is a Gaussian white noise vector with covariance Ω.
We decompose the innovation variance as follows Σt = FtDtF
′
t , where Ft is a lower
triangular matrix with ones on the main diagonal and Dt a diagonal matrix. Let σt be
a column vector containing the diagonal elements of D
1/2
t and let φi,t, i = 1, ..., n− 1, be
a column vector containing the first i elements of the (i+ 1)-th row of F−1t . We assume
the following laws of motion
log σt = log σt−1 + ξt (3)
φi,t = φi,t−1 + ψi,t (4)
where ξt and ψi,t are Gaussian white noise vectors with zero mean and variance Ξ and
Ψi respectively. Let us define φt = [φ
′
1,t, . . . , φ
′
n−1,t], ψt = [ψ′1,t, . . . , ψ′n−1,t] and let Ψ be
the covariance matrix of ψt. We make two additional assumptions. First, ψi,t and ψj,t
are uncorrelated for j 6= i. Second ξt, ψt, ωt, εt are mutually uncorrelated.4
4For details about the estimation we refer the reader to the online appendix of Gali and Gambetti
AEJ-Macro forthcoming.
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The time-varying impulse response functions are Ct(L) =
∑∞
k=1Ck,tL
k, with C0,t = I
and Ck,t = Sn,n(Akt ), where At =
(
At
In(p−1) 0n(p−1),n
)
and Sn,n(X) is a function which
selects the first n rows and n columns of the matrix X. The structural impulse response
functions are obtained as follows. Let St be the Cholesky factor of Σt (StS
′
t = Σt) and
let Ht be an orthogonal matrix (HtH
′
t = I) satisfying the identifying restrictions (see
section 3.3). The structural impulse response functions are Ct(L)StHt and the structural
shocks are et = H
′
tS
−1
t εt.
3.2 Data
For each economy we estimate one model including five quarterly variables spanning the
period 1980Q1 to 2011Q4: real GDP, a consumer price index, non-financial private sector
loan volumes, a composite lending rate and a reference short-term interest rate. Chart 1
shows all time series used in the analysis, while details on the definition, treatment and
sources of the data are reported in the Supplementary Material Annex.
The evolution of real GDP growth shows how all three economic areas experienced
recessions in similar periods (the early 1980s, the early 1990s and between 2008 and
2009), although with some variation in terms of turning points. Moreover, the data are
consistent with the evidence for a Great Moderation from the mid-1980s until the most
recent crisis. It is striking how synchronised and of similar magnitude the slowdown in
real GDP growth was between 2008 and 2009 across these economic areas.
The consumer price index selected for each economic area is that representing the
main reference for the corresponding central bank: the harmonised index of consumer
prices (HICP) for the Euro Area, the retail prices index (RPI) for the United Kingdom
and the consumer price index (CPI) for the United States. In all three economic areas it is
apparent how inflation gradually declined during the 1980s and has been at relatively low
and stable levels since the early 1990s, with signs of increased volatility only reappearing
over the last few years.
The reference short-term interest rates are represented by the 3-month Treasury bill
rates for the United Kingdom and the United States, while for the Euro Area we use
the 3-month Euribor up to the beginning of the recent crisis. The crisis which started
in August 2007 affected interbank money markets significantly with a loss of confidence
and associated disruption of unsecured interbank lending market, implying that the
corresponding interest rates (Euribor or Eonia) may be of questionable representativeness
as reference interest rates. Thus, we use the 3-month Euro Repo rate, for secured
interbank lending, from 2007 onwards as a reference short-term interest rate for the
Euro Area.
As regards to loan volumes, we consider series which correspond to indices for the
outstanding amounts of loans granted by financial intermediaries to households and
9
non-financial corporations, corrected for the impact of loan sales and securitisation. The
latter correction is important to gauge the amount of loans originated by banks, as
in recent years the fraction of loans granted and subsequently securitised and taken
off banks’ balance sheets has been significant. For the US we use data from the flow
of funds statistics, which include not only loans obtained by US households and non-
financial corporations by commercial banks, which in contrast to the Euro Area and
to some extent also the United Kingdom represent only a small fraction to total loans
obtained by these sectors, but also loans from other sources (see for example ECB, 2009).
The data show how the credit cycles in the three economic areas appear to be relatively
synchronised.
For the composite lending rates a weighted average of lending rates for loans to house-
holds and for loans to non-financial corporations are used, with weights corresponding to
the respective loan outstanding amounts. Since no official series exists for any of these
economic areas, we have constructed such series using available interest rates and (for the
weights) loan data for the various loan categories. These series have some limitations,
especially for the 1980s, as they do not cover all types of loans and are based on data
not fully harmonised (for example across Euro Area countries, especially for the 1980s
and to some extent also 1990s). The constructed series do not display unexplainable
movements or excessive volatility and they seem to behave similarly across the three
economic areas, but the limited quality of these data represents a source of uncertainty
for the results of any analysis like the present one.
3.3 Identification
We identify four shocks: a loan supply shock, an aggregate supply shock, an aggregate
demand shock and a monetary policy shock. Intuitively, a loan supply shock can be
associated with various events, such as unexpected changes in bank capital available for
loans (for example due to a change in regulatory capital ratio requirements), unantici-
pated changes in bank funding (for instance following bank runs or the introduction of
credible deposit insurance schemes or changes in the ceiling of the latter), unexpected
changes in the risk perception of potential borrowers by bank management (for example
following changes in key bank managerial positions or innovations in bank monitoring
technology) or unexpected changes in the degree of competition in the banking sec-
tor (which might induce a change in the structure of the industry and therefore affect
primarily the role of credit markets in propagating shocks and be characaterised as a
structural change but may also give rise to unexpected changes in the availability of loan
supply that could be characaterised as structural shocks). Examples of aggregate supply
shocks include technology or productivity shocks, oil price shocks and labour supply
shocks. Aggregate demand shocks include consumption or preference shocks, investment
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demand shocks and fiscal policy shocks. Monetary policy shocks are associated with
unexpected changes in policy interest rates, thus including so-called standard or conven-
tional monetary policy shocks and not necessarily shocks associated with non-standard
or unconventional monetary policy measures. While our empirical model includes five
variables, therefore allowing us to identify up to five shocks, we prefer to identify only
four structural shocks and leave one of the reduced form shocks unidentified in order for
such residual shock to act as a buffer and capture the effects of omitted variables and
other shocks conceptually not belonging to any of the four categories identified.
Although the main focus of the paper is on loan supply shocks, identification of other
key categories of disturbances helps the identification of the loan supply shock (Paustian,
2007). Identification is achieved by means of sign restrictions, as summarised in Table
1. The latter are chosen with reference to a set of benchmark macroeconomic models.
Instead of adopting sign restrictions implied by a specific model, it can be argued that it
is more robust to derive identification restrictions which are common to a set of recent
benchmark models in the literature. Unfortunately, it is virtually impossible to derive
restrictions to identify loan supply shocks which are fully consistent with even a small set
of benchmark models. Indeed, as shown in Table 2, benchmark models including shocks
which can be associated with loans supply disturbances, such as those by Christiano et
al. (2010), Cu´rdia and Woodford (2010), Gerali et al. (2010) and Gertler and Karadi
(2011), tend to have somewhat different implications for the sign of the impact impulse
responses to even the small set of macroeconomic and credit market variables under
consideration.5 Differences can, of course, be explained by different modelling choices as
well as different estimation approaches, although in most respects these models reflect
standard modelling and estimation choices. At the same time, a number of restrictions
seem very frequent. Indeed, an expansionary loan supply shock (defined as loan supply
shock which leads to an increase on real GDP on impact as well as cumulatively during
the first four quarters) appears to have most often a positive immediate impact on all
variables except the lending rate, for which a negative impact is most commonly found.
Thus, we choose to adopt these five identification restrictions for loan supply shocks: on
impact a loan supply shock implies changes with the same sign for real GDP, inflation, the
short-term interest rate and loan volumes, and changes of the opposite sign for the lending
rate. These restrictions are consistent with all specific loans supply shocks of the Cu´rdia
and Woodford (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011) models and with some specific
credit supply shocks of the models of Christiano et al. (2010) and Gerali et al. (2010).
The idea underlying these restrictions is that, in the case of an expansionary loan supply
shock, if a bank decides exogenously to expand the supply of loans to the private sector it
5We are very grateful to Vasco Cu´rdia, Peter Karadi, Roberto Motto and Stefano Neri for discussions,
clarifications and additional material on their respective models.
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would do so by increasing the quantity made available and/or by decreasing the lending
rate (or, more likely, both), such that at aggregate level both effects are observed. This
would have an expansionary effect on output as households would borrow more and use
some of these funds to expand their consumption and enterprises would borrow more and
use some of these funds to expand their investments. The increased expenditure would
exert inflationary pressures which would lead the central bank to increase the interest
rate to contain them. These restrictions differ from those adopted by other authors in
some respect, as for example Eickmeier and Ng (2011) and Hristov et al. (2012) do
not impose any restriction on inflation on the ground that some models have conflicting
implications in this regard, but then in order to identify these shocks and ensure they
are not confused with other shocks such as aggregate supply shocks or monetary policy
shocks they have to include restrictions on additional variables (such as various spreads,
as Eickmeier and Ng (2011), who also impose restrictions on the sign of the response
of the spread between the corporate bond yield and long-term interest rates and of the
spread between the corporate bond yield and short-term interest rates, although it is
difficult to find a model with all these implications) or unnecessary restrictions for other
shocks (such as on the sign of the response of the short-term interest rate to aggregate
supply shocks, as Hristov et al., 2012). 6
Restrictions for the other three shocks are selected on the basis of the same benchmark
models used as reference for loans supply shock identification (to the extent possible, as
not all of these four models include all four types of shocks considered), complemented by
the implications of another benchmark macroeconomic model, the Smets and Wouters
(2007) model (which does not include a credit sector), to increase the robustness of the
selected restrictions. As regards aggregate supply shocks, most of these models imply
opposite signs of the impact responses of real GDP and inflation, which are sufficient to
identify them and are therefore adopted in our scheme (Table A in the Supplementary
Material Annex). Aggregate demand shocks tend to imply impact responses of the
same sign for all variables except for loan volumes and accordingly we impose these
restrictions to real GDP, inflation, the short-term interest rate and the lending rate,
which is enough to identify these shocks (Table B in the Supplementary Material Annex).
Finally, monetary policy shocks can be identified by assuming that real GDP and inflation
react on impact with the same sign while the impact response of short-term interest rates
is of opposite sign to that of real GDP, which is in line with most models considered
6The restrictions imposed to identify loan supply shocks also differ from other authors such as Busch
et al. (2010), who impose the same set of sign restrictions but for different periods, such as a positive
sign of the response of inflation to an expansionary loan supply shock but only after one period, which
forces them to impose also sign restrictions for monetary policy shocks with different lags, such as the
impact of inflation to a monetary policy shock which is imposed only after two periods, which appears
somewhat arbitrary.
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(Table C in the Supplementary Material Annex).
The restrictions are imposed on the lending rate and not on the spread between the
lending rate and the short-term interest rate as changes in the latter as well as loan
volumes may also be induced by shocks other than loan supply disturbances, including
for example wealth shocks (i.e. an expansionary wealth shock may induce an increase
in the demand for loans, leading to a possible increase in the lending rate but also
inflationary pressures with a possible increase in the policy rate, with an uncertain sign
of the spread in the short run). Moreover, the impulse responses of the various shocks
for the spread within the benchmark models considered are more uncertain than the
correponding ones for the lending rate.
The sign restrictions adopted are imposed on the variables only on impact, as the
variation of the sign of impulse responses to the various shocks considered across the
benchmark models discussed is higher for the case of the impulse responses in the short
term (i.e. with lags from one to four, both for each single quarter and cumulatively)
as well as the medium term (i.e. twelve quarters). Thus, in the specific case under
consideration (i.e. for the four shocks considered) imposing the sign restrictions only on
impact implies a relatively more robust identification scheme with reference to theoretical
models compared to the approach of imposing sign restrictions for multiple periods, as
several other authors chose to do, including Busch et al. (2010), Eickmeier and Ng (2011)
and Hristov et al. (2012).
Technically speaking, at each point in time and for each draw of the reduced form
coefficients we draw Ht in such a way that the elements of each row represent the coordi-
nates of a point uniformly distributed over the unit hypersphere and that is orthogonal
to the other points defined by the remaining columns, see Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner and
Zha (2010).
4 Results
4.1 Evidence of time-variation
The evolution of the residual time-varying variances is shown in Chart 2. In most
cases there is evidence of significant time-variation in the residual variances, with spikes
appearing most often in the most recent years in correspondence to the latest economic
and financial crisis. Moreover, for the short-term interest rate there are clear signs of
a decrease in their volatility during the first half of the sample for all three models.
Overall, the evidence supports the use of stochastic volatility specifications for all three
models.
Table 3 shows the posterior mean of the trace of Ω as well as 68% confidence bands
and the trace of Ω0 (i.e. the prior variance-covariance matrix). This is a way to establish
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whether time-variation in the parameters is a feature of the data, see Cogley and Sargent
(2005). In all three cases, the trace of Ω0 is lower than the 16% percentile, pointing to
the presence to time-variation in the data, as the sample points towards greater time-
variation in the parameters than that of the prior selected.
4.2 The average effect of loan supply shocks
The average impulse response functions to loan supply shocks over the whole sample
period show remarkable similarities across the three economic areas. The posterior mean
of the impulse responses and the 68% confidence bands appear in most cases very similar
(Chart 3). For example, an expansionary loan supply shock seems to have a large but
short-lasting (less than a year) positive impact on real GDP in all three cases. However,
it appears to be stronger in the short run for the United Kingdom and United States,
than for the Euro Area, although only to a very minor extent. Moreover, for all three
economic areas the positive impact on inflation tends to last two years (for the United
Kingdom and United States) or longer (more than four years for the Euro Area), with
the short-run impact being stronger in the United Kingdom. On average, expansionary
loan supply shocks seem to correspond to a larger increase in loan volumes in the United
Kingdom compared to the Euro Area and the United States, with also clear differences
in the persistence of such positive effects (ranging from about two and a half years in
the United States to three and a half in the Euro Area and to more than five years in
the United Kingdom). The decline in the lending rate tends to be very short-lived in
all three economic regions, starting to increase after one quarter after the shock and
remaining positive for a longer period, especially in the United Kingdom and in the
Euro Area. The responses of short-term interest rates seem to be in line with those of
inflation, as for example the former is larger in the short term in the United Kingdom,
where the inflationary impact of loan supply shocks appears to be stronger, while the
positive response of short-term interest rates lasts for a shorter period in the United
States compared to the Euro Area and the United Kingdom, as in the Nort-American
economy the impact of loan supply shocks on inflation tends to last relatively fewer
quarters.
The average importance of loan supply shocks can be assessed on the basis of variance
decompositions, shown in Chart 4 for various horizons. Overall, these shocks seem to
explain a sizeable fraction of the variance of all variables in all three economic areas,
especially beyond the very short horizon of one quarter. In all three areas, these shocks
appear to explain about 15% to 20% of the variance of both real GDP growth (for which
loan supply shocks seems to be relatively slightly more important in the Euro Area) and
inflation at business cycle frequency (i.e. between one year and three years horizons).
Loan supply shocks seem to explain a larger fraction of the variance of loan volumes in
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all three cases, ranging between 25% and 30% beyond very short horizons. By contrast,
loan supply shocks appear to be less important to explain the variance of the lending
rate, explaining on average between 5% and 15% of their variance, while the average
contribution of these shocks to the variance of the short-term interest rate is slightly
higher, ranging from10% to 20%.
4.3 The evolution of the effect of loan supply shocks over time
The evolution of the impulse responses over time for different horizons suggests that some
time-variation can be detected in several cases (Chart 5 and Charts A to C and G to K in
the Supplementary Material Annex). In general, it appears that the short-term impact
of these shocks on real GDP and inflation may have increased in all three economic areas
over the past few years. For loan growth, the impact of loan supply shocks seems to have
increased in the most recent years in both the short and medium-run (i.e. one- to three-
year) in the Euro Area, while in the United Kingdom they appear to have decreased in
the second half of the sample compared to the first half. By contrast, for the United
States some time variation for the impact of loan supply shocks on loan growth can be
detected, but rather than displaying different regimes it appears to be cyclical in the
short-run. Finally, the responses of the lending rate and the short-term interest rate
appear to have remained close to zero beyond the short term in all three areas over the
whole period, with at most signs of a slightly stronger response of these rates in the
initial part of the sample in all three economic areas and possibly signs of an increasing
impact of the short-term interest rate in the short run in the Euro Area and the United
Kingdom.
Observing variance decompositions over time also provides some impression of time-
variation in some cases (Charts D to F and L in the Supplementary Material Annex).
More specifically, the fraction of real GDP growth variance explained by loan supply
shocks appears to have increased since the early 2000s in both the Euro Area (from
about 20% in the 1990s to between 25% and 30% in th emost recent years) and in the
United States (from close to 10% in the second half of the 1990s to above 20% in the
most recent years). By contrast, over the sample period considered the fraction of loan
growth variance explained by these shocks appears to have gradually decreased in the
United Kingdom and the United States (in both cases from close to 30% in the initial
years of the sample to close to 20% in the most recent years for most horizons) and,
from the early 2000s onwards, also in the Euro Area (from above 30% to close to 20%
in the most recent years). Moreover, the fraction of lending rates variance explained by
these shocks seems to have decreased significantly in the first decade of the sample in all
three economic areas (from between 15% and 30% in the intial years of the sample to
close to 10% in the most recent years). By contrast, for inflation and short-term interest
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rates no major signs of time-variation can be detected in the Euro Area and the United
Kingdom, while signs of a lower fraction of variance of these two variables explained by
loan supply shocks can be seen for the United States for the second half of the sample.
The evolution of the effect of loan supply shocks can also be assessed on the basis
of historical decompositions, or counterfactuals (which indicate how each variable would
have evolved in the absence of these shocks). Overall, it appears that the contribution
of loan supply shocks has been particulary important during the mosr recent recession
(Chart 6). For example, the contribution of these shocks can explain almost 20% of
the decline in annual real GDP growth between 2007 and 2009 (i.e., from the peaks in
2007 to the troughs in 2009) in the Euro Area and the United States and almost 10%
of that observed in the United Kingdom. For example, instead of falling from 3.8%
growth in 2007Q1 to -5.0% in 2009Q1 (or 8.8 percentage points), Euro area real GDP
annual growth would have fallen from 3.6% to -3.5% (or 7.1 percentage points) over
the same period. By contrast, in all three economic areas loan supply shocks appear to
have contributed to a mimimal extent to the recessions of the early 1990s. Loan supply
shocks accounted also for significant fractions in the evolution of loan volumes in all
three economies in specific periods. In particular, in the absence of loan supply shocks
the decline in the annual growth rate of loans observed from the peaks of 2006/2007
to the troughs of 2009/2010 would have been about 25% smaller in the Euro Area and
almost 10% smaller in the United Kingdom and the United States.
4.4 The role of loan supply shocks during specific recessions and re-
coveries
As discussed in the previous section, counterfactuals indicate that loan supply shocks
appear to have played significant roles in driving both the early 1990s and the 2008/2009
recessions in all three economic areas. This is confirmed by the impulse responses of real
GDP especially during the most recent recession in all three economies, as the impact
responses are clearly stronger than the average ones (Chart 7 and Charts M to O in
the Supplementary Material Annex).7 By contrast, the difference between the responses
during the early 1990s recession do not seem very much different from the average ones.
Similar evidence emerges for the responses of loans to loan supply shocks, with stronger
impacts observed for the most recent recession, for the Euro Area (but not for the United
Kingdom and the United States), while not much difference can be observed for the early
1990s recession.
7Turning points are those identified by the CEPR Euro Area Business Cycle Dating Committee for
the Euro Area and the NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee for the United States, while for the
United Kingdom they are based on real GDP growth with recessions defined as periods of two or more
consecutive negative quarter-on-quarter growth rates.
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A comparison of the responses across recent recessions and the subsequent recoveries
- defined here as developments in the four quarters following the trough - suggests that
no major asymmetries emerge. In particular, in most cases the response of real GDP
to loan supply shocks during the recessions discussed and subsequent recoveries appears
very similar. Similarly, the responses of loan growth to the loan supply shock are very
similar across these recessions and recoveries. Thus, there does not seem to emerge
evidence of systematic asymmetries across business cycle phases in the response of loan
supply shocks.
Beyond counterfactuals and impulse responses during specific business cycle phases,
the series of structural shocks can also provide useful information on the role of loan
supply shocks around recession periods. Moreover, a visual inspection of these series
can provide an indirect way to assess the plausibility of the method adopted to identify
loan supply shocks. Indeed, although there is no perfect way to assess whether the
shocks identified correspond in fact to exogenous or unexpected changes in loan supply,
an informal assessment of their plausibility can be undertaken by observing the series of
structural shocks and discussing particular spikes with reference to anecdotal information
on real world events. Chart 8 shows the series for the loan supply shocks for all three
economic areas. It can be observed that large negative spikes can be found in all three
cases in 2008Q4, i.e. immediately after the default of Lehman Brothers (September
2008), which presumably had an immediate unexpected adverse effect on the balance
sheet of most banks, among other effects. For the United States this negative spike
corresponds to the largest adverse shock over the whole sample. For the Euro Area a
large negative spike can be found in 2008Q4, which is not the largest in the sample, but
was followed by another large negative spike in 2009Q1, marking the strongest adverse
cumulative spikes over two adjacent periods in the whole sample. Similarly, the negative
spike in 2008Q4 in the United Kingdom was not the largest in the sample but together
with that in 2008Q3 gives the strongest adverse cumulative spikes over two adjacent
periods in the whole sample (together with two contiguous spikes in 2000). Moreover,
for the United States large negative spikes can also be observed in the early 1990s, in
coincidence with the so-called ”capital crunch ” associated to the early 1990s recession
(Bernanke and Lown, 1991; Peek and Rosengren, 1995) and in 1999Q2, in the aftermath
of the Long-Term Capital Management crisis.8 Overall, it can be observed that in all
three economies considered a number of consecutive negative spikes can be found during
8A comparison of the loans supply shocks with available banking survey data would be tempting but
would have severe limitations. Indeed, indicators from surveys such as the ECB Bank Lending Survey, the
Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey or the Bank of England’s Credit Conditions Survey
are all endogenous, that is they reflect changes in response to both the economic situation and exogenous
changes independent of the latter. Trying to estimate both components is difficult and inevitably affected
by high uncertainty, not least due to the short span of the survey indicators.
17
most of the main recessions. Moreover, these series are in line with a significant role
played by adverse loan supply shocks during the early 1990s and 2008/2009 recessions
in all three economies.
5 Conclusions
This paper provides some evidence that loan supply shocks have played an important
role in business cycle fluctuations in the Euro Area, the United Kingdom and the United
States over the past three decades. The model adopted, a time-varying parameters VAR
with stochastic volatility, seems to be particularly useful to capture the role of these
shocks over the business cycle, as evidence can be found of both significant time variation
in parameters and stochastic volatility. The main results of the empirical analysis suggest
clearly that loan supply shocks have a significant effect on economic activity, inflation and
credit markets in all three economic areas, although some differences across geographic
areas and changes over time can be uncovered. Moreover, while there is no evidence of
a systematic asymmetry in the impact of loans supply shocks between recent recessions
and the subsequent recovery, it appears that the contribution of loan supply shocks
was particulary important during the most recent recession in all three economic areas
considered. This evidence suggests that policy-makers in the Euro Area, the United
Kingdom and the United States should monitor closely developments in credit markets,
and close attention to developments in the banking sector is warranted.
As a follow-up to this work, it would be of much interest to try to identify more
specific types of loan supply shocks, including those arising from unexpected devel-
opments in bank capital, bank funding and credit risk. This would however require
adopting larger models, including for example more detailed credit market variables. Al-
though currently estimating and simulating large models with time-varying parameters
and stochastic volatility still poses difficult technical challenges, it is likely that soon
advances in econometric research will allow for such an undertaking.
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Table 1 – Identification restrictions 
SHOCK real  GDP inflation short term interest rate lending rate loan volumes
Aggregate supply  + ‐ no res triction no restriction no restriction
Aggregate demand + + + + no restriction
Monetary policy + + ‐ no restriction no restriction
Loan supply + + + ‐ +  
Note:  Sign  imposed  on  the  impulse  response  on  impact  of  all  variables  for  the  case  of  an 
expansionary shock (i.e. a shock causing an increase in real GDP). 
 
Table 2 – Impulse responses to an expansionary loan supply shock in selected models 
model shock to real  GDP inflation
policy 
interest rate
lending 
rate
loan
volumes
Christiano et al. (2010) bank funding technology + ‐ ‐ ‐ ≈0
bank reserve demand + + uncertain ‐ +
Cúrdia‐Woodford (2010) bank resource cost function + + + ‐ +
bank loss  rate + + + ‐ +
Gerali  et al. (2010) bank capital + ‐ ‐ ‐ +
loan to value ratio E + + + + +
loan to value ratio HH ≈0 + + + +
loan rate E + + + ‐ +
loan rate HH + + + + +
Gertler‐Karadi  (2011) bank capital  quality + + + ‐ +
bank’s  net worth  + + + ‐ +  
Note:  Sign  of  the  impact  impulse  response  of  an  expansionary  loan  supply  shock  (i.e.  a  loan  supply  shock 
causing an increase in real GDP) of key macroeconomic and credit variables. The response of the policy interest 
rate to the shock to bank reserve demand  in the Christiano et al.  (2010) model  is uncertain as results are of 
opposite sign for the euro area and the US. For the signs of impact impulse responses to both shocks discussed 
in Christiano et al. (2010) see Fig. 15, p. 120. For the signs of impact impulse responses in Cúrdia and Woodford 
(2010)  see  Fig.  2,  p.  17  (for  the  baseline  case with  standard  Taylor monetary  policy  rule,  reported  for  the 
symmetric  case  of  a  contractionary  shock)  for  the  bank  loss  rate  shock  (while  for  the  bank  resource  cost 
function shock they are based on additional material kindly provided to us by Vasco Cúrdia). For the signs of 
impact impulse responses in Gerali et al. (2010) see Fig. 8, p. 136 for the bank capital shock, reported for the 
symmetric case of a contractionary shock (while for the other loan supply shocks they are based on additional 
material kindly provided to us by Stefano Neri). For the signs of impact impulse responses in Gertler and Karadi 
(2011) see Fig. 2, p. 28 (for the baseline case with a financial accelerator, reported for the symmetric case of a 
contractionary shock) for the bank capital quality shock (while for the bank’s net worth shock they are based 
on additional material kindly provided to us by Peter Karadi). 
 
Table 3 – Trace tests 
16% perc. 50% perc. 84% perc. trace(Q0)
Euro area 1.086 1.667 2.899 0.068
United Kingdom 0.847 1.146 1.639 0.095
United States 3.431 5.046 8.164 0.292
 
Note:  The  first  three  columns  with  figures  show  the  16%,  50%  and  84% 
percentiles of the posterior of the trace of the variance‐covariance matrix of 
the error term of the law of motion of the parameters of the VAR, while the 
fourth  column  shows  the  trace  of  the  prior  variance‐covariance  matrix. 
Following Cogley and Sargent (2005), since the value of the trace of the prior 
variance‐covariance matrix  is smaller than even the 16% percentile, this can 
be  interpreted as evidence pointing to the presence of time variation  in the 
parameters of the VAR (i.e. the sample points towards greater time variation 
in the parameters than that of the prior selected). 
 
  
  
Chart 1 ‐ Data 
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Note: See Appendix A for details on data sources, definitions and treatment.  
  
Chart 2 ‐ Stochastic volatility
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Note: Residual time‐varying variances, median, 16% and 84% percentiles.
  
Chart 3 ‐ Impulse response functions to loan supply shock (median whole sample period)
Real GDP   Inflation Loans Lending rate Short term interest rate 
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Note: Averages of impulse response functions over time. Line is the median, grey are delimits the space between the 16% and 84% percentiles.
  
Chart 4 – Variance decomposition: fractions explained by loan supply shocks (median whole sample period)
Real GDP Inflation Loans Lending rate Short term interest rate 
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Note: Fractions of variances of each variables explained by  loan supply shocks at various horizons. “LS” stands  for  fraction of variance explained by  loans supply shocks, while “OTH” 
stands for fraction of variance explained by other shocks.  
 
 
Chart 5 – Evolution of impulse response functions of all variables to a loan supply shock at impact
Real GDP growth Inflation   Loan growth Lending rate Short‐term interest rates 
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Note: Evolution of impulse responses of real GDP growth to a loan supply shock at specific horizons over time, median, 16% and 84% percentiles.  
 
 
 
  
Chart 6 – Counterfactual: evolution of the variables in the absence of loan supply shocks  
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Note: Counterfactual exercises: evolution of variables in the absence of loan supply shocks.  
 
  
 
Chart 7 ‐ Impulse response functions of all variables to loan supply shocks during and after the 2008/2009 and early 1990s recessions in the euro area 
  Real GDP growth: EA  Real GDP growth: U.K. Real GDP growth: U.S. Loan growth: E.A. Loan growth: U.K. Loan growth: U.S. 
 
   
 
    
 
 
    
Note: Impulse response functions averages in specific recessions and subsequent recoveries as defined in first column in the Euro Area. Line is the median, grey area delimits the space 
between the 16% and 84% percentiles. Recessions as identified by the CEPR, recoveries as first four quarters after troughs.        
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Chart 8 – Series of structural loan supply shocks
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Shaded areas delimit recession periods, as  identified by the CEPR  for the Euro Area, by the Bank of England  for the 
United Kingdom and by the NBER for the United States.   
